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The secure transfer of information is an important problem in modern telecommunications. Quan-
tum key distribution (QKD) provides a solution to this problem by using individual quantum systems
to generate correlated bits between remote parties, that can be used to extract a secret key. QKD
with D-dimensional quantum channels provides security advantages that grow with increasing D.
However, the vast majority of QKD implementations has been restricted to two dimensions. Here
we demonstrate the feasibility of using higher dimensions for real-world quantum cryptography by
performing, for the first time, a fully automated QKD session based on the BB84 protocol with
16-dimensional quantum states. Information is encoded in the single-photon transverse momentum
and the required states are dynamically generated with programmable spatial light modulators. Our
setup paves the way for future developments in the field of experimental high-dimensional QKD.
Theft of electronic information is a major problem in modern telecommunications. For instance, recent advances
in computing technology such as the ever growing parallel processing power of graphical processing units (GPUs),
have allowed the brute-force cracking of passwords to be greatly sped up [1, 2]. A very promising solution to the
issue of information security is quantum key distribution (QKD), also called quantum cryptography [3]. Quantum
cryptographic schemes allow remote parties to share a secret key (a sequence of bits) through the use of quantum
channels. This key is later used for secure information transmission, and the advantage of QKD is that the presence
of an eavesdropper may, in principle, be detected. The first QKD protocol was proposed in 1984 by Bennett and
Brassard, called BB84 [4]. It employs two sets of orthogonal quantum states spanning two mutually unbiased bases
(MUBs) [5]. BB84 is a prepare-and-measure QKD protocol, in which single quantum systems are exchanged between
the communicating parties (Alice and Bob) for the establishment of each shared secret key bit.
Most experimental implementations of quantum cryptography have been done with BB84-based QKD schemes.
Experiments with increased performance (i.e. higher transmission distance, larger secure key generation rate, more
compact schemes, etc...) have been demonstrated in the past few years [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11], and the vast majority of
these demonstrations have employed only two-dimensional quantum systems. The use of high dimensional systems
has been nevertheless widely deployed in classical digital communications for many years, as a way to maximize
the efficiency of the transmission channel [12]. With the same goal, the first studies on the theoretical framework
to generalize the BB84 protocol to high dimensional state spaces were carried out over a decade ago [13, 14, 15].
It was shown that there is an important additional feature in moving to higher dimensions in QKD: increased
security, which is alone a major motivation to implement high-dimensional quantum cryptography. Nonetheless,
due to experimental challenges, there have been only proof-of-principle experiments of QKD in higher dimensions
[16, 17, 18].
Recently, on the theoretical front, the interest on high-dimensional QKD did not wane as security bounds were
derived considering finite key lengths [19]. Moreover, an important experimental tool has emerged in recent years
to dynamically manipulate light in free-space, the spatial light modulator (SLM) [20]. The capabilities of the
SLMs have been explored in experiments of quantum information and it is now widely recognized as a tool for the
manipulation of high-dimensional quantum systems (qudits) encoded in the transverse momentum of single photons
[21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26]. In classical optical communications, SLMs have also been used to multiplex and demultiplex
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classical high-speed data streams, further increasing the channel capacity [27]. Nevertheless, in spite of all recent
progress, a demonstration of a quantum key exchange session using the BB84 protocol in higher dimensions is still
lacking. In this paper this issue is finally addressed.
We report an automated QKD session between Alice and Bob, based on the BB84 protocol extended to 16-
dimensional quantum systems [15]. We employ the linear transverse momentum of single-photons as the degree of
freedom for encoding the qudit states [28]. The single-photons are produced by Alice from attenuated laser pulses.
At Alice and Bob’s sites, the quantum states spanning the MUBs are randomly produced with the help of SLMs,
dynamically introducing relative phases between the paths available for the propagation of the single photons [25].
The entire setup is synchronized working at a repetition rate of 30 Hz, which is the current physical limit of standard
commercially available SLMs. The custom electronics required for the full automated execution of the protocol were
developed on field programmable gate array (FPGA) units. The measured quantum bit error rate (QBER) of the
correlated bits generated was smaller than half of the bound allowed for extracting a secret key while considering
the general coherent attacks; and close to three times smaller than the limit for individual attacks [15, 19].
Results
In this demonstration we take advantage of the flexibility allowed by SLMs to encode information using the transverse
wave profile of single photons. Although it is a continuous degree of freedom, it can be discretized using slits to define
different possible paths for the photon transmission [28]. The SLMs are built with liquid crystal displays (LCDs)
and require the use of polarizers. They allow an individual control of the gray level of each pixel on the LCD [29].
While changing the pixel gray level, the polarization is changed and when combined with the polarizers, the light
transmissivity of the pixel is varied. Together with this effect a relative phase change may also be induced in each
pixel. The slits can be directly generated on the SLM. This is done by programming the gray levels of all the LCD
pixels such that areas with high transmissivity correspond to the slits, and everywhere else has zero transmission.
By employing a set of D parallel slits a Hilbert space of D dimensions is constructed. The state after the slits can
be written as the following coherent superposition:
|Ψ 〉 = 1√
D
lD∑
l=−lD
| l 〉eiφl , (1)
where lD = (D − 1)/2 . | l 〉 represents the state of the photon transmitted by the lth-slit of the SLM [28]. The
uniform amplitude distribution is obtained with an adequate choice of the spatial beam profile on the plane of the
slits [25]. This state can be generated provided that the single-photons have a larger transverse coherence length than
the distance between the outermost slits. φl are the relative phase shifts at each slit. Each φl can be dynamically
changed in real-time in the SLMs.
In standard BB84 quantum cryptography, the required states are two vectors of two-dimensional MUBs, with a
total of four states required. In the case of a multi-dimensional BB84 protocol, the individual states to be sent and
measured {| Ψ(β)0 〉, . . . , | Ψ(β)D−1〉} belong to two D-dimensional MUBs. The index β denotes a specific MUB with
β = α, α′. In this experiment 16 slits are employed, generating a 16-dimensional Hilbert space. Consequently 32
states had to be generated, 16 for each MUB. Of the large number of families of MUBs that exist in 16 dimensions
[30], we chose two MUBs that only required phase modulations of 0 and pi and no amplitude modulation (see
Methods). This eased the implementation of the MUBs states with the SLMs.
Alice needs to randomly choose in which MUB, α or α′, she will encode her qudit. She then randomly chooses
one of the D possible states from this MUB. As we will explain next, in our scheme, this is done by using a phase-
modulation SLM and pseudo-random subroutines to depict a sequence of pre-defined masks. Upon successfully
receiving the photon, Bob needs to make a projective measurement. He also randomly chooses states from α and
α′. For this purpose, Bob uses a detection apparatus composed of a phase-modulation SLM, a lens and a “point-
like” avalanche single photon detector (APD) [shown in Fig. 1(a)]. The single-photon detector remains fixed at the
center of the focal plane. It covers the transverse blue zone of 10µm indicated in Fig. 1. At the SLM, Bob depicts
phase-masks where the phases at each slit are chosen in accordance with the MUBs states given in the Methods
section. In this case, the probability of single-photon detection is proportional to |〈Ψ(α)k |Ψ(α)k′ 〉|2 (|〈Ψ(α)k |Ψ(α
′)
k′ 〉|2)
when Alice and Bob choose the states belonging to the same (different) MUBs, where k, k′ = 0, ..., D− 1. Each time
Bob matches his state choice with Alice’s, while both choose the same MUB, constructive spatial interference occurs
2
Figure 1: Detection procedure. (a) Detection apparatus. See the main text for details. (b) Numerical simulation
showing the single-photon spatial distribution in the case that Alice and Bob have both chosen the same state |Ψ(α)k 〉
in the same MUB α. We have arbitrarily chosen states 13 from MUBs α and α
′
and state 7 from α to illustrate the
distributions. The dashed blue dotted lines indicate the boundaries of the 10µm circular pinhole used in front of the
detector in the experiment. In this case, the probability of detecting the single-photon is maximum. (c) Alice and
Bob choose different states |Ψ(α)k 〉 and |Ψ(α)k′ 〉 from the same MUB α. In this case the detection probability is null.
(d) The detection probability when two vectors are chosen, from the two distinct MUBs. In this case a detection
probability of 1/16 is obtained.
and the probability of single-photon detection (the single count rate) is maximal [See the example of Fig. 1(b)].
When the vectors are not matched, and Alice and Bob have chosen the same MUB, total destructive interference
occurs at the transverse area of the detector [See the example of Fig. 1(c)]. When Alice and Bob’s choices of MUBs
are not the same (incompatible) the probability of detection is 1/D regardless of which states were chosen by both
[See the example of Fig. 1(d)].
In our experiment the light source is a single-mode continuous-wave laser with a 690 nm emission wavelength
(See Fig. 2). It is followed by an acousto-optic modulator (AOM), which sets the optical pulse repetition frequency.
The width of the pulses depends on the average photon number employed. Two mean photon numbers per pulse
were used, µa = 0.60 and µb = 0.18, to test the performance of our QKD prototype. A 50 ns optical pulse for
the case of µa is generated by the AOM. For the results with µb, a 20 ns optical pulse was used instead. An extra
calibrated attenuator (not shown in Fig. 2) is also used to set precisely the desired average photon number at the
output of Alice’s station. The average photon number was measured directly at Alice’s output with a removable
mirror and a single-photon detector with known overall detection efficiency (also not shown in Fig. 2).
We employed three SLMs, two located within Alice, and the other belonging to Bob. The first SLM (SLM1)
is programmed to perform amplitude modulation in order to generate the slits. This stage defines the number of
paths available for the photon transmission and, therefore, the dimension to be used in the experiment, 16 in our
case. The mask projected on this SLM remains fixed throughout the experiment. The slits are 2 pixels wide, with a
separation of 1 pixel between them, with each pixel having an area of 32 x 32 µm2. The relation between the width
of the slits and the separation between them was chosen to maximize the distribution probability in the center of
the detection plane, when Alice and Bob take the same state [See Fig. 1(b)]. A set of polarizers is used before and
after each SLM.
A first set of lenses is used as a beam expander to illuminate the entire area of the slits at the SLM1 with
attenuated pulses. A second set of lenses forms the image of SLM1 onto the second SLM (SLM2). This SLM is
configured for phase-modulation in order to implement the phase shifts required for constructing the MUBs states
at Alice’s station. This is done following the technique introduced in [25]. The single-photon is then transmitted
through a free-space channel (here consisting of a third telescope set of lenses), forming the image of Alice’s output
onto Bob’s modulator (SLM3). This link is 50 cm long. A final lens following the SLM3 focuses the light onto the
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Figure 2: Experimental setup. The laser light source is followed by an acousto-optic modulator (AOM) which
defines the optical pulses repetition frequency and width, see text for details. A FPGA unit is used by Alice to
trigger the AOM and randomly project phase-masks in the SLM2 to encode the states required in the 16-dimensional
BB84 protocol. Bob has a different FPGA unit to randomly perform the MUBs states projections and to count
the single-photon detections at the avalanche photo-detector (APD). The FPGAs are connected between themselves
for synchronization. Each FPGA is connected to a personal computer (PC1 and PC2) who perform the basis
reconciliation procedure while communicating through an Ethernet cable, which acts as the public channel. The
single-photons are transmitted from Alice to Bob through free-space with a telescope system forming the transmission
channel (Trans. Channel).
APD.
The entire system is synchronized at 30 Hz, with the master clock generated within Alice’s FPGA and distributed
to Bob through an electrical cable for synchronization. Alice’s FPGA unit is used to trigger the AOM and generate
the attenuated pulses. The pulses generated are naturally phase randomized due to the low repetition frequency
of the pulses when compared to the laser coherence length. Nevertheless for higher operating frequencies, it can
be actively phase randomized with schemes such as [31]. The bases and state choices done by Alice and Bob
are performed independently using pseudo-random number generator subroutines in their individual FPGAs. For
each clock pulse Alice and Bob choose, independently, a mask from the 32 distinct possibilities and project them
onto SLM 2 and SLM3, respectively. Bob’s FPGA unit records the single-photon detections at the APD. It also
controls the detection window duration, which is 50ns when working with µa and 20ns for µb. Each FPGA records
the corresponding state choice and is connected to a personal computer (PC1 and PC2) who perform the basis
reconciliation procedure through an Ethernet cable.
For each photon number µa and µb, the protocol is then executed continuously and the basis reconciliation done
in parallel to the data acquisition. In the reconciliation procedure the detections for compatible and incompatible
basis choices by Alice and Bob are split. At this point all the incompatible detections are discarded. An important
figure of merit for any QKD setup is the QBER, whose definition is (Ni)/(Nc+Ni), where Nc and Ni are the correct
and incorrect detections at Bob’s detector. For this experiment the Nc detections correspond to the sums of all
the ones obtained when both MUB vectors chosen by Alice and Bob are the same. The Ni detections are the sum
of the detections when Alice and Bob do not choose the same MUB vectors. In the real-world scenario there will
always be practical issues such as imperfect components and misalignment. Therefore, the detected probabilities
will differ from the ideal ones. In order for any QKD protocol to be secure, the QBER must be below a certain
value. This value depends on the attack strategy allowed for Eve, as well as the number of dimensions of the system.
Following the bounds provided in [15], we calculate that with 16 dimensions the error rate threshold for secure key
generation when considering individual attacks is Dind = 37.50%. For the more general class of collective attacks
we obtain an upper bound of Dcoh = 28.97%. In our experimental implementation the measured QBER is shown
in Fig. 3 together with the breakdown of the detections into the different types of detected events. In the case of
using µa, the average QBER is 13.4±4%. In the QKD session with µb, the average QBER is 15.6±7%. One can
note the stability provided by the setup due to the small variations in the QBER during the long experimental runs.
In both cases the QBER is below the security thresholds of individual attacks as well as collective attacks. This
indicates that a positive net key rate can be extracted from the sifted bits [15]. Nevertheless, further theoretical
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Figure 3: Experimental results. (a) Number of detections as a function of the number of elapsed hours for the QKD
session with µa = 0.60 photons per pulse. The detections are broken down into raw key (total detections), sifted
key (sum of the detections when Alice and Bob choose the same MUB), Nc (sum of all the detections when the
same state from the same MUB is chosen by both Alice and Bob) and Ni (sum of all the detections when different
states from the same MUB are chosen). Each row sums up the results of 12 hours of continuous measurements.
(b) The measured QBER as a function of continuous elapsed hours of the QKD session with µa. Error bars show
the statistical error in the calculation of the QBER. The two security thresholds for general collective (Dcoh) and
individual attacks (Dind) are also plotted with dotted lines. The average QBER is 13.4±4% with an average sifted
key rate of 27.0 bits / hour. (c) The same as part (a) but with µb = 0.18 photons per pulse. (d) Same as (b) but
with µb. The average QBER in this case is 15.6±7% and an average sifted key rate of 11.1 bits / hour. Note, that
in both cases the QBER is well below the security thresholds of individual attacks as well as collective attacks.
studies are needed to optimize the optimum average photon number per pulse, as a function of the transmission
distance for high-dimensional QKD. The average obtained sifted key rate is 27.0 and 11.1 bits / hour for µa and µb,
respectively. No post-processing was done in the sifted key bits. Finally, we have calculated the Shannon’s entropy
H ≡ ∑ pklogpk for the detected symbols for both µa and µb, where pk is the probability of detecting state k. We
obtain an entropy of 3.98± 0.03 and 3.92± 0.05 bits for the QKD sessions with µa and µb, respectively. Both cases
are close to the theoretical maximum of 4 bits/symbol when working in a 16-dimensional Hilbert space.
Discussion
Here, we have experimentally demonstrated an automated QKD session based on the BB84 protocol extended to
16-dimensional quantum states. The QBER remains constant and below the security limits, showing the robustness
and stability of the setup. Our work therefore can be seen as an initial point for the development of real-world
experimental high-dimensional QKD. It paves the way for future investigations in this area. For example, the new
generation of SLMs based on ferroelectric liquid crystals allows for frame rates up to 1 kHz. So, one may envisage
that they will allow for faster key generation rates in schemes similar to the setup presented here. Moreover,
recent developments on integrated silicon photonics have demonstrated SLMs with a modulation speed of 150 MHz
[32]. They are designed to modulate the light in one transverse direction and, thus, they match the requirements
for encoding information using the linear transverse momentum. Another line of investigation is the study of
propagation of spatially-encoded qudits for QKD through optical fibers. This is challenging since single-mode fibers
cannot be used and multi-mode fibers scramble the information across the modes. Nevertheless progress has been
made recently using photonic crystal fibers [33] and multi-mode fibers with active compensation of scattered light
propagation [34]. This last technique is promising for our setup since it involves the transmission of images through
multi-mode fibers. In principle, the image of Alice’s SLM would be formed onto the fiber, propagated, then imaged
again on Bob’s SLM. Last, it is worth to mention that our scheme can also be adapted to investigate the performance
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of other QKD protocols in higher dimensions [35], and study fundamental related concepts [36].
Methods
Mutually unbiased bases
The two employed MUBs are displayed here. They obey the condition that | 〈φ(α)k | φ(α
′)
k′ 〉 |2= δαα′ ∗δkk′+ 1d(1−δαα′),
where α and α′ denote the two MUBs. k and k′ label the states in a given MUB. For sake of simplicity, we describe
the MUB’s states in terms of unitary transformations. The MUBs are given by:
U (α) =
1√
16


1 −1 1 1 −1 1 −1 1 −1 1 1 1 1 1 −1 −1
−1 1 1 1 −1 1 1 −1 1 1 −1 −1 1 1 1 −1
1 1 1 −1 1 −1 1 1 −1 1 −1 1 1 −1 1 −1
1 1 −1 1 1 1 1 −1 1 −1 1 1 1 −1 −1 −1
−1 −1 1 1 1 −1 1 1 1 −1 1 1 −1 1 1 −1
1 1 −1 1 −1 1 1 1 −1 −1 −1 1 −1 1 1 1
−1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 −1 1 1 −1 −1 −1 −1 1
1 −1 1 −1 1 1 1 1 1 −1 −1 −1 1 1 −1 1
−1 1 −1 1 1 −1 −1 1 1 1 −1 1 1 1 −1 1
1 1 1 −1 −1 −1 1 −1 1 1 1 1 −1 1 −1 1
1 −1 −1 1 1 −1 1 −1 −1 1 1 −1 1 1 1 1
1 −1 1 1 1 1 −1 −1 1 1 −1 1 −1 −1 1 1
1 1 1 1 −1 −1 −1 1 1 −1 1 −1 1 −1 1 1
1 1 −1 −1 1 1 −1 1 1 1 1 −1 −1 1 1 −1
−1 1 1 −1 1 1 −1 −1 −1 −1 1 1 1 1 1 1
−1 −1 −1 −1 −1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 −1 1 1


,
U (α
′) =
1√
16


1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 −1 1 1 −1 −1 1 −1 1 −1 −1 −1 −1 1 1
1 −1 1 1 −1 −1 1 −1 1 −1 −1 −1 −1 1 1 1
1 1 1 −1 −1 1 −1 1 −1 −1 −1 −1 1 1 1 −1
1 1 −1 −1 1 −1 1 −1 −1 −1 −1 1 1 1 −1 1
1 −1 −1 1 −1 1 −1 −1 −1 −1 1 1 1 −1 1 1
1 −1 1 −1 1 −1 −1 −1 −1 1 1 1 −1 1 1 −1
1 1 −1 1 −1 −1 −1 −1 1 1 1 −1 1 1 −1 −1
1 −1 1 −1 −1 −1 −1 1 1 1 −1 1 1 −1 −1 1
1 1 −1 −1 −1 −1 1 1 1 −1 1 1 −1 −1 1 −1
1 −1 −1 −1 −1 1 1 1 −1 1 1 −1 −1 1 −1 1
1 −1 −1 −1 1 1 1 −1 1 1 −1 −1 1 −1 1 −1
1 −1 −1 1 1 1 −1 1 1 −1 −1 1 −1 1 −1 −1
1 −1 1 1 1 −1 1 1 −1 −1 1 −1 1 −1 −1 −1
1 1 1 1 −1 1 1 −1 −1 1 −1 1 −1 −1 −1 −1
1 1 1 −1 1 1 −1 −1 1 −1 1 −1 −1 −1 −1 1


.
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